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The	18	April	1948	Italian	election:	Seventy	years	on
Italy’s	election	on	4	March	was	far	from	the	first	Italian	election	campaign	to	have	generated	high	levels
of	interest	across	the	rest	of	Europe.	Effie	G.	H.	Pedaliu	writes	on	the	seventieth	anniversary	of	one	of
Italy’s	most	significant	and	controversial	elections:	the	1948	Italian	general	election,	which	pitted	the
country’s	Christian	Democrats	against	the	Popular	Democratic	Front	in	which	the	Italian	Communist
Party,	the	largest	communist	party	outside	the	Soviet	Union,	was	the	dominant	partner.
The	sound	and	fury	unleashed	by	the	populist	onslaught	in	Italy’s	recent	general	election	on	4	March	2018	may
obscure	the	seventieth	anniversary	of	one	of	the	country’s	most	significant,	controversial	and	decisive	general
elections,	that	of	18	April	1948.
The	1948	election	was	the	first	general	election	since	Mussolini’s	‘march	on	Rome’	in	1922	and	Italians	were	going	to
the	ballot	box	not	just	to	elect	a	government,	but	also	to	determine	the	political	orientation	of	their	country.	The	result
would	not	only	shape	the	future	of	Italy,	but	it	was	also	considered	to	be	critical	to	the	survival	of	the	West	and	the
post	WWII	liberal	democratic	order.
Italians	faced	a	straight	choice:	to	vote	either	for	Alcide	de	Gasperi’s	Christian	Democrats	or	Palmiro	Toglatti’s	and
Pietro	Nenni’s	Popular	Democratic	Front	in	which	the	Italian	Communist	Party,	the	largest	communist	party	outside
the	Soviet	Union,	was	the	dominant	partner.	A	political	slogan	of	the	time	encapsulated	the	dramatic	and	binary
nature	of	the	choice	facing	Italians:	‘o	con	cristo	o	contro	cristo’	(either	with	Christ	or	against	Christ).
In	collective	memory,	the	18	April	1948	election	has	been	associated	with	the	massive	levels	of	foreign	intervention
in	Italy’s	domestic	affairs	to	ensure	the	defeat	of	the	PCI.	The	arrival	of	Cold	War	bipolarity	had	turned	Italy	into	a
major	prize	and	to	Washington	and	London,	it	appeared	that	the	immediate	future	of	the	West	hinged	upon	the
election	result.	A	rejection	at	the	ballot	box	of	the	Christian	Democrats,	the	party	that	identified	with	Italy’s	post	WWII
western	orientation,	would	mean	an	overt	rejection	of	the	Western	liberal	democratic	model,	since	from	the	moment
of	its	liberation,	Italy	had	been	under	the	tutelage	of	the	British	and	the	Americans.	An	electoral	victory	by	the	PCI,
though,	would	signify	that	the	Western	ideal	had	been	found	wanting	and	that	countries	could	turn	Communist
through	the	ballot	box	rather	than	through	force,	Red	Army	invasions	or	the	use	of	internal	subversion.	Such	a	result
would	amount	to	nothing	less	than	a	huge	propaganda	coup	for	the	Soviet	Union	that	could	have	strengthened	the
appeal	of	Communism	everywhere.
The	Americans	decided	to	avert	a	Communist	victory	‘by	all	feasible	means’	and	by	‘taking	off	the	gloves’.	The	newly
established	institutions	of	the	US	National	Security	State	apparatus,	the	National	Security	Council	(NSC)	and	the
Central	Intelligence	Agency	(CIA)	were	deployed	to	assess	the	risks	and	to	elaborate	action	plans	to	damage
electoral	prospects	of	the	Communists.	The	Truman	Administration’s	well-documented	intervention	in	Italy	was	so
extensive	and	intrusive	that	in	Paul	Ginsborg’s	opinion,	it	was	‘breath-taking	in	its	contempt	for	any	principle	of	“non
intervention”	in	the	internal	affairs	of	an	independent	country’.
In	their	fight	against	Italian	communism,	the	US	utilised	unrestricted	psychological	and	political	warfare,	incorporating
among	other	means,	black	propaganda,	meddling	in	trade	union	politics,	suitcases	of	money	changing	hands	in
some	of	Rome’s	most	exclusive	and	elegant	hotels,	letter	writing	campaigns	by	the	Italian-American	community,	red,
white	and	blue	‘friendship	trains’	distributing	gifts	that	had	been	sent	from	the	US	and	Hollywood	with	Frank	Sinatra
and	Gary	Cooper	even	playing	their	part.
Many	contemporary	commentators	and	historians	have	credited	the	US	for	swinging	the	result	in	the	favour	of
Christian	Democracy.	The	Truman	administration	itself	reached	the	same	conclusion.	It	came	to	believe	in	the
efficiency	of	its	methods	and	its	confidence	grew.	Indeed,	the	methods	used	in	1948	Italy	would	form	the	blueprint	for
similar	American	interventions	in	the	domestic	politics	of	countries	that,	as	Henry	Kissinger	put	it	in	the	1970s,	could
‘go	communist	due	to	the	irresponsibility	of	[their]	people’.
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Alcide	De	Gasperi	and	Palmiro	Togliatti,	Credit:	Wikimedia	Commons	/	Presidenza	Del	Consiglio	Dei	Ministri	(Public	Domain)
Although	British	intervention	was	lower	key,	it	was	no	less	spectacular	nor	less	invasive.	The	Attlee	government
employed	tactics	that	aimed	to	‘win	votes	for	the	Christian	Democrats	and	spike	the	Communist	gun.’	By	this	stage,
British	influence	in	Italian	affairs	had	waned,	especially	after	the	announcements	of	the	Truman	Doctrine,	the
Marshall	Plan	and	the	delivery	of	US	Interim	Aid	to	Italy	during	1947.	Yet,	Britain	was	still	uniquely	placed	to
influence	the	result.
If	Palmiro	Toglatti’s	Communists	were	to	win	they	could	do	so	only	with	Pietro	Nenni’s	Socialists	as	the	two	parties	of
the	Left	were	contesting	the	election	under	the	joint	banner	of	the	Popular	Democratic	Front.	The	Labour	government
through	its	Foreign	Secretary,	Ernest	Bevin,	had	direct	links	with	the	organised	Italian	Labour	movement	and
especially	with	the	PSI.	The	Labour	Party	tried	to	convince	Nenni	to	ditch	the	‘fusion	pact’	or	failing	this,	to	weaken
the	PSI.	This	was	in	line	with	Bevin’s	determination	that	Britain	ought	to	offer	support	to	all	democratic	anti​-
communist	elements	in	Europe	to	resist	the	spread	of	communism	westwards.	In	his	view,	British	social	democracy
offered	to	Europeans	a	more	attractive	ideological	alternative	to	communism	than	American	style	capitalism	ever
could.	He	sought	to	exploit	his	belief	by	turning	‘London	into	the	Mecca	for	social	democracy	in	Europe’	and
therefore,	maintaining	British	influence	in	the	post	WWII	world.
Bevin	was	unimpressed	by	America’s	blatant	methods	insisting	on	a	more	understated	approach.	He	advised	the
Americans	to	be	more	cautious	and	resisted	their	pressure	for	the	British	to	adopt	more	visible	tactics.	The	British
intervened	in	the	internal	politics	of	the	Italian	labour	movement	both	at	the	party	political	and	at	the	trade	union
levels.	Morgan	Phillips	(Secretary	of	the	Labour	Party)	and	Denis	Healey	(Secretary	of	the	International	Department
of	the	Labour	Party)	were	instrumental	in	all	the	developments	taking	place	within	the	Italian	Socialist	Party	from
before	the	Palazzo	Barberini	split	onwards	and	they	provided	guidance	to	the	secessionist	factions	of	Ivan	Matteo
Lombardo	and	Giuseppe	Saragat	as	well	as	securing	their	recognition	by	the	international	labour	movement.
The	British	also	took	steps	to	manipulate	food	supplies,	made	naval	visits	to	Italian	ports,	looked	into	solutions	for
Italy’s	surplus	population	problem,	proposed	Franco-Italian	border	adjustments	in	favour	of	Italy,	participated	in	the
Tripartite	Declaration	on	the	future	of	Trieste	and	waived	off	all	western	claims	for	the	extradition	of	alleged	Italian
war	criminals.	Finally,	they	exploited	the	high	reputation	of	the	BBC	among	Italians	to	communicate	anti-communist
messages	put	together	by	the	Information	Research	Department	of	the	Foreign	Office.
In	reality,	however,	probably	the	most	influential	factor	in	this	election	was	not	the	‘frank	and	open’	foreign
intervention,	but	the	fight	the	Vatican,	Christian	Democracy	and	the	Italian	state	put	up.	The	Minister	of	the	Interior,
Mario	Scelba	reinforced	and	kitted	out	the	Italian	police	with	the	most	up	to	date	equipment	and	empowered	it	to	use
any	amount	of	violence	it	judged	necessary	to	break	up	demonstrations	by	workers	and	peasants.	Police	morale	was
boosted	and	its	attempts	to	disarm	the	North	turned	quickly	into	an	anti-communist	purge.	Hundreds	of	arrests	were
made	and	many	arms	caches	were	uncovered.
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The	Vatican	also	entered	the	fray	directly	through	the	clergy	and	indirectly	through	its	collateral	organisations	such
as	Catholic	Action.	They	engaged	in	the	‘poster	war’,	even	venturing	into	newsreel	and	propounding	the	message	‘In
the	secrecy	of	the	voting	booth,	God	can	see	you,	Stalin	cannot’.	The	Italian	clergy	undertook	the	task	of	demolishing
Togliatti’s	claim	that	voting	communist	was	not	incompatible	with	being	‘a	good	Catholic’.	The	Church	refused	the
sacraments	to	known	Communists	and	Socialists	and	acted	as	the	Christian	Democratic	party’s	electoral	machine	to
bring	the	vote	out.	Also,	as	David	Ellwood	has	put	it,	‘only	the	Vatican	could	have	commanded	the	Virgin	Mary	to
participate	in	processions	through	every	town	and	village	with	the	maximum	of	devotional	rites	for	the	salvation	of
Italy’.	Indeed,	a	Marian	frenzy	overtook	the	country	‘with	weeping	Madonnas,	bleeding	Madonnas	and	luminous
Madonnas’	appearing	to	young	and	old	alike.	The	events	at	Gimigliano	are	well	documented	and	offer	an	insight	into
some	of	the	emotive	religiosity	that	the	election	whipped	up	and	how	the	pro	Christian	Democrat	media	manipulated
it.
The	Christian	Democrats	also	mastered	the	art	of	film-making	in	order	to	attract	votes.	Cinema	was	the	most	popular
pastime	in	Italy	at	this	time	and	film	became	had	become	an	important	medium	in	influencing	public	opinion.	Giulio
Andreotti,	the	minster	responsible	for	cinema,	used	public	finances	to	fund	newsreels	that	projected	a	pro-American
message,	focusing	on	reconstruction	and	urging	people	to	put	the	war	behind	them	by	hinting	of	a	better	future
provided	people	voted	responsibly	and	the	right	result	was	delivered	at	the	ballot	box.	Ernst	Lubitsch’s	Ninotska,
a1939	anti-communist	movie	starring	Greta	Garbo,	was	shown	non-stop	in	many	Italian	movie	theatres.
Complementing	all	this,	the	Christian	Democrats	monopolised	the	airwaves	in	a	country	where	half	the	household
had	access	to	radio	receivers	and	refused	their	opponents	access	to	the	radio.
The	Communists	proved	to	be	less	adept	at	embracing	new	methods	of	communication	to	propound	their	message.
They	depended	on	the	printed	word	to	spread	their	message	using	heavy	evidence	based	arguments	and	theoretical
analyses	rather	than	something	more	easily	digestible.	They	were	also	behind	the	times	when	it	came	to	targeting
and	reaching	their	voters	by	over-relying	on	public	meetings,	mass	rallies	and	festivals.	By	the	time	they	did	decide	to
invest	in	film	the	Christian	Democrats	had	already	won	that	war.	Indeed,	Luchino	Visconti’s	neo-realist	masterpiece
La	Terra	Trema	(Golden	Lion	Prize	Winner,	Venice	Film	Festival,	1948)	began	life	as	a	documentary	financed	by	the
PCI	to	be	shown	during	the	pre-election	campaign	and	to	highlight	the	misery	of	poverty.	However,	Visconti’s	artistic
temperament	produced	a	moody	three	hour-long	film	rather	than	a	propaganda	documentary.	As	Andreotti	had
already	realised,	people	preferred	‘more	legs,	less	rags’.
In	retrospect,	it	appears	that	the	communist	message	had	probably	been	‘spiked’	even	earlier	by	the	‘exclusion	crisis’
of	May	1947,	when	the	PCI	and	PSI	were	thrown	out	of	government	and	probably	too,	at	the	time	of	De	Gasperi’s
return	to	Italy	in	January	1947	from	his	trip	to	the	US.	Since	1943,	the	Italians	had	endured	defeat,	‘liberation’,
occupation,	low	level	civil	war,	hunger,	uncertainty,	impoverishment,	unemployment	and	social	unrest.	They	yearned
for	stability	and	prosperity.	Their	country	neighboured	Greece,	a	country	in	the	throes	of	a	civil	war	and	France	where
after	the	‘exclusion	crisis’,	the	French	Communist	Party	had	adopted	violent	protest	as	a	means	of	reversing	the
political	situation.	The	events	in	France	and	Greece	influenced	Italian	public	opinion	negatively	as	did	the	divisive
message	coming	from	the	Cominform.
The	activities	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	run	up	to	the	Italian	election	harmed	rather	than	enhanced	the	prospects	of
the	PCI	and	reflected	the	ambiguity	surrounding	Soviet	policy	towards	Western	Europe	in	general	and	towards	Italy,
in	particular.	Stalin’s	main	preoccupation	was	how	to	consolidate	the	Soviet	sphere	of	influence	in	Eastern	Europe
and	to	avoid	outside	interference.	Therefore,	he	seemed	to	prefer	a	‘divided	and	docile	Europe’.	In	February	1948,
just	two	months	before	the	Italian	election,	there	was	a	coup	in	Czechoslovakia.	Then,	in	March,	Jan	Masaryk,	the
Czech	Foreign	Minister	who	had	been	in	favour	of	the	Marshall	Plan,	died	in	mysterious	circumstances.
Over	Trieste,	Stalin	did	not	wish	to	alienate	Marshall	Tito’s	Yugoslavia	by	leaning	towards	Italy	and	declined	to
support	the	Tripartite	Declaration.	Unlike	Britain	and	the	US,	the	USSR	did	not	renounce	its	share	of	the	Italian	Fleet.
Furthermore,	the	Soviets	vetoed	Italian	membership	of	the	UN	for	the	third	time.	The	only	inducements	to	Italians
they	were	willing	to	offer	was	to	announce	that	they	were	willing	to	support	Italy	to	secure	trusteeship	over	its	ex-
colonies	for	a	fixed	period	of	time.	This	was	not	something	that	was	likely	to	catch	the	Italian	imagination	in	view	of
the	Soviet	disdain	of	Italian	aspirations	for	international	rehabilitation,	events	in	Eastern	Europe	and	the	daily
negative	publicity	aimed	at	the	Soviet	Union.
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In	this	climate,	Togliatti	was	unable	to	please	Stalin	and	at	the	same	time	present	the	PCI	as	a	purely	Italian	party
that	was	not	prepared	to	put	the	interests	of	a	foreign	power	above	the	national	interest.	Their	exclusion	from	power,
after	having	shared	it	for	three	years,	convinced	the	PCI	that	the	only	way	back	into	government	was	to	intimidate	De
Gasperi	and	persuade	him	he	could	not	govern	without	the	support	of	the	Communists.	This	high-risk	tactic	meant
that	the	PCI	needed	to	try	to	balance,	perfectly,	between	the	consensual	principles	of	‘la	svolta	di	Salerno’	on	the	one
hand	and	on	the	other,	to	threaten	violence	and	clandestine	activity.	The	scare	tactics	of	‘doppiezza’	(duplicity)	aimed
at	presenting	the	PCI	as	a	revolutionary	party	when	it	had	already	decided	that	it	would	not	‘turn	Italy	into	another
Greece’.	Doppiezza	proved	difficult	to	get	right.
Togliatti’s	posturing	speech	in	Parma,	in	September	1947,	presented	Italians	with	the	possibility	of	the	PCI	mobilising
its	30,000-armed	men	against	the	government.	This	was	followed	by	a	wave	of	strikes	in	late	1947,	action	that	had
been	foisted	on	the	PCI	by	the	Cominform	in	order	to	sabotage	the	chances	of	the	Marshall	Plan.	Doppiezza	failed	to
make	De	Gasperi	relent,	but	succeeded	instead	in	stirring	up	a	multitude	of	fears	in	an	already	fear-ridden	electorate
making	the	PCI	appear	to	be	serving	Soviet	interests	and	offering	Italians	yet	more	turmoil	at	a	moment	when	the
prospect	of	economic	recovery	was	becoming	discernible.	In	Ennio	di	Nolfo’s	words	‘[fear]	came	from	down	below
and	would	last	long,	since	in	the	months	running	up	to	the	elections	the	most	basic	emotions	had	been	stirred’.
In	such	an	environment,	whoever	offered	hope	would	win	the	election	and	the	PCI	appeared	as	bent	on	‘killing	hope’.
As	Leo	Valliani	remarked,	the	choice	facing	Italians	was	to	pick	one	of	two	patrons:	the	Soviet	Union	that	offered
‘bleakness	and	harshness’	or	‘the	West	that	not	only	promised	but	had	already	offered	largesse	and	had	also	the
support	of	the	ministers	of	God’.	The	choice	was	easy	and	the	result,	when	it	came,	was	clear.
The	Christian	Democrats	polled	48.51%	of	the	vote	with	the	combined	ticket	of	the	PCI	and	PSI	getting	30.98%.
Indeed,	many	Italians	voted	for	the	Christian	Democrats	despite	being	liberals,	socialists	and	social	democrats
because	they	did	not	wish	to	let	the	PCI	win	a	majority	and	drag	Italy	closer	to	the	Soviet	Union.	In	the	1948	election,
the	electorate	used	its	vote	to	deliver	a	clear	result	on	the	future	direction	of	the	country.
In	the	most	recent	Italian	election	of	4	March	2018,	voters	opted	to	prolong	indecision.	In	contrast,	the	1948	election
was	typified	by	the	coalescence	of	votes	around	the	major	parties,	to	such	an	extent,	that	in	certain	areas	of	northern
Italy	small	parties	almost	disappeared	with	the	Mezzogiorno	remaining	the	only	part	of	the	country	where	they	were
able	to	survive.
Obviously,	the	combination	of	circumstances	and	events	surrounding	the	general	elections	of	1948	and	2018	are
materially	different.	However,	in	both	elections	the	emotions	of	fear	and	anger	were	prevalent.	Unfortunately,	in	the
most	recent	Italian	election	the	message	of	hope	and	the	worth	of	Western	values	were	drowned	out	by	voters’	fears
over	the	weak	Italian	economy,	their	fears	over	high	unemployment	(well	above	the	EU	average)	and	fears	over	the
huge	public	debt	(the	Bank	of	Italy	revealed	recently	that	the	country	owes	approximately	2.3	trillion	euros).	Beset	by
such	fears,	the	general	election	of	2018	allowed	demagogic	Italian	politicians	to	whip	up	an	extravagant	anti-EU	and
anti-migrant	frenzy.
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